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perspective. The LTCM crisis had no significant contagion effects in the banking sector either, but banks
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A striking development in the 1990s has been the emergence of the view that events in 
emerging markets could endanger the stability of the global financial system. As former Secretary 
of the Treasury Rubin puts it in an interview, "I can't imagine that twenty or twenty-five years 
ago my predecessors would have been worried about an economic crisis in Thailand or Indonesia, 
or even Korea." (Friedman (1999), p. 186). The events of 1998 seem to provide evidence in 
support of this view. As one observer puts it, "the entire global economic system as we know it 
almost went into meltdown, beginning with Russia's default" (Friedman (1999), p. 212).  
As a response to the perceived threat to financial stability from emerging market crises, the 
1990s have seen bailouts of unprecedented size. Mexico, Korea, and Brazil received packages of 
aid in excess of $40 billion each. Thailand, Indonesia, and Russia received packages between $10 
billion and $40 billion. The proponents of bailouts h ave argued that they were necessary to 
prevent contagion and systemic threats. The critics of bailouts have pointed out that they heighten 
moral hazard, so that banks find it optimal to take bigger gambles because they do not suffer as 
much if the gambles fail.  
In this paper, we examine the impact of crises and bailouts on U.S. bank stock prices to 
assess some of the issues raised by proponents and opponents of bailouts. First, we investigate 
whether currency crises in emerging markets had a significant impact on banks. After taking into 
account movements in the stock market, banks without exposure to the country in trouble were 
generally not affected by the adverse events but banks with exposure were. Second, we examine 
the impact of the largest bailouts. We find that they significantly benefited banks with exposure to 
the bailed out country and generally had no significant impact on banks without exposure. Third, 
we consider the LTCM crisis, which is useful to put emerging market crises in perspective since 
no public funds were used in the bailout. The banks which participated in the LTCM rescue lost 
dramatically when the LTCM losses became known and when the rescue was announced.    2 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents our sample and exposure measures. Section 
2 provides estimates of the impact of adverse currency events in the Mexican, Korean, Russian, 
and Brazilian crises on U.S. banks. Section 3 shows the effect of the bailouts of Mexico, Korea, 
and Brazil on U.S. banks. Section 4 focuses on the LTCM events. Section 5 concludes.  
1. Data and measurement issues. 
 
  We use the method of event studies commonly used in finance. We therefore identify 
relevant events and estimate their impact on stock prices. Our hypothesis is that systemic threats 
decrease bank stock prices because they affect adversely the value of banking franchises.  
  To evaluate the impact of events, we regress bank portfolio daily excess returns (the 
return minus the risk-free rate) on the excess returns of the Datastream U.S. market index, on 
changes in the 7-day Eurodollar rate, and on dummy variables for the event days. The estimates 
of the dummy variables are the abnormal returns reported in this study. Table 1 provides the 
abnormal returns on key dates.
1 One might argue that  controlling for market movements is 
inappropriate since the events might be causing the market movements. We discuss market 
movements when relevant. For all the crises considered, we start the sample period in January of 
the year of the crisis and include at least 319 trading days. We use the banks that belong to the 
Datastream retail banking index.  
  Event studies are based on the presumption that the market impounds all the new 
information in stock prices immediately. Because of this presumption, there are two difficulties 
with event studies. First, the importance of an event might be underestimated because stock prices 
already partially or completely reflected its economic impact before it occurred. Second, an 
announcement may take place after markets are closed on that day, so that the stock-price 
                                                 
1 The appendix reproduces the regression estimates, the list of exposed and non-exposed banks for each 
country, and the list of relevant dates. Kho and Stulz (2000) apply this approach to events of the East Asian 
crisis and discuss the robustness of results when this approach is used.    3 
reaction takes place on the next day when markets are open. We deal with these difficulties by 
including as event days the trading days before and immediately after the news announcement.  
  To identify banks exposed to a country, we use the exposure reported in annual reports as 
closely as possible to the first event date associated with the country's crisis, assuming that the 
market knows these exposures. We then construct portfolios of exposed and of non-exposed 
banks. Exposed banks are those that report a positive exposure to the crisis country. Banks did not 
report exposure to LTCM. Further, while a bank might have been a counterparty to LTCM or 
have lent to LTCM, it might also have been affected by the LTCM crisis because it attempted to 
mimic LTCM's positions. We consider those banks that participated in the rescue of the fund 
exposed since these banks were willing to put up their own funds to prevent the crisis from 
worsening.  
A systemic risk should affect all banks, not just the large ones, so that equally-weighted 
portfolios of banks are most relevant to estimate the impact of events on systemic risk. However, 
an alternative view is that the large banks which dominate value-weighted portfolios are those 
that matter when one is concerned about the financial system. We therefore point out some 
differences that arise when we use value-weighted portfolios.  
2. Do emerging market crises matter for the U.S. financial system?  
Mexico devalued its currency on December 20, 1994 and announced the next day that the 
parity would no longer be defended. These currency events impacted the market on December 21.  
On that day, exposed banks had an abnormal return of  -1.37%  (the p-value or p in the following 
is 0.03). In contrast, the other banks had an abnormal return of –0.03%, so that exposed banks 
performed worse by 1.34% (p = 0.01). In the case of Korea, the exposed banks had an abnormal  
return of -1.5% (p = 0.07) on the trading day before Korea stopped defending its parity, but the 
abnormal return is not significantly different from the non-exposed banks.    4 
With Russia, non-exposed banks had an abnormal return of –1.40% (p = 0.06) on the day 
of the devaluation and of the default on various debt instruments, while the exposed banks had a 
positive insignificant abnormal return of 0.11%. Exposed banks lost 2.11% (p = 0.13) on the day 
of the suspension of the ruble convertibility, August 28, and lost 4.19% (p < 0.01) on the day 
before. Yet, non-exposed banks had an insignificant total abnormal return over these two days of 
-0.35%. The banks experienced significant positive abnormal returns on August 31. On the three 
trading days around the suspension of the convertibility, the Datastream index for the U.S. market 
fell by a dramatic 11.74%. Including the market fall, exposed banks lost 17.91% on these three 
days, while non-exposed banks slightly outperformed the market since they lost 10.77%. Around 
the Russian events, liquidity in markets dried up dramatically. It is therefore important to note 
that, since the banks exposed to Russia include banks with large derivatives and proprietary 
businesses, the losses of these banks may have been due more to the impact of liquidity drying up 
than to the impact of the events on the credit risk of loans to Russia held by these banks.  
For Brazil, there was a significant capital outflow at the beginning of September 1998 
which overlapped with the LTCM announcements. On September 3, banks exposed to Brazil lost 
4.57%. Banks that were not exposed lost an insignificant 0.63%. Banks exposed to Brazil but not 
exposed to LTCM had an abnormal return of -2.18% (p = 0.05) on September 3. The devaluation 
of the real had no impact on banks. When Brazil announced it would no longer defend its parity, 
exposed banks fell by 2.43% (p = 0.04) and non-exposed banks fell by 1.22% (p = 0.08) on the 
next trading day.  
  Based on our evidence, currency events in emerging markets matter for U.S. banks. 
However, they affect exposed banks and leave non-exposed banks largely untouched. It is hard to 
argue that the events considered are economically important for non-exposed banks after taking 
into account market movements.    5 
3. Bailouts and U.S. banks.  
  Looking at the mega-bailouts of Mexico, Korea, and Brazil, we find that in each case, at 
least one bailout event surprised the markets. In the case of Mexico, the exposed banks earned an 
abnormal return of 1.44% (p = 0.02) on January 25, 1995, the day before the tentative approval of 
IMF support, in contrast to the non-exposed banks which earned an insignificant 0.51%. The 
difference between the two groups of banks has a p-value of 0.08. No other Mexican event had 
significant abnormal returns. In the case of Korea, the critical event occurred on December 1, 
1997, when it became clear there would be a bailout agreement. On that day, exposed banks had 
an abnormal return of 2.09% (p = 0.01) while non-exposed banks earned 1.22% (p = 0.03). The 
difference between the two groups is insignificant. In addition, the U.S. market index earned 
1.93% on December 1. One might argue that in this case the IMF program might have had 
systemic benefits, but the abnormal return of non-exposed banks is smaller and not significant 
when we use a value-weighted portfolio, indicating that the effects on these banks were weak at 
best.
2 Finally, in the case of Brazil, exposed banks earned 1.95% (p = 0.09) on the day that 
negotiations with the IMF opened while non-exposed banks gained an insignificant 0.92% on that 
day. The difference between the two groups is not significant, however. On October 8, 1998, 
when Brazil and the IMF issued a joint statement, the abnormal return of exposed banks was 
3.46% (p < 0.01) in contrast to the abnormal return of -2.44% (p < 0.01) for non-exposed banks. 
On that day,  the market fell by 1.45%. Finally, on the day of IMF support announcement, the 
exposed banks earned 2.53% (p = 0.03) while the non-exposed banks earned 0.14%. The 
difference between the two groups is significant.  
  Russia provides a confirmation of our analysis of bailouts. In the case of Russia, the New 
York Times had an article on August 27 that the "IMF steps back." That day was rich in news 
                                                 
2  Kho and Stulz (2000) provides a more detailed analysis of  the Korean crisis but considers only three 
exposed American banks, JP Morgan, Citibank, and Chase Manhattan Bank. In that paper, the gains of the 
three banks are substantially larger than the gains for all exposed banks reported here.   
   6 
about Russia. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that exposed banks lost 4.19% (p < 0.01) 
while non-exposed b anks lost an insignificant 0.70%. The difference between the two groups is 
significant (p = 0.01).  
  Our analysis of bailout event returns shows that the informative events had significant 
positive abnormal returns for exposed banks and, except for Korea, insignificant abnormal returns 
for non-exposed banks. The highest gains of the exposed banks are for the bailout of Brazil. We 
can estimate the dollar amount of the increase in the capitalization of exposed banks as a result of 
the bailout as follows. At the end of September 1998, the equity capitalization of banks exposed 
to Brazil was about $230 billion and the capitalization of non-exposed banks was slightly more 
than $430 billion. On the three dates associated with IMF announcements for Brazil, the sum of 
the abnormal returns of exposed banks amounted to 7.74% using a value-weighted portfolio, and 
thus the capitalization of exposed banks increased by about $17.8 billion.  
4. LTCM and U.S. banks. 
News about LTCM losses was made public on September 2. On t he three days 
surrounding September 2, the four banks in the Datastream retail banking index for the U.S. that 
subsequently attended the meeting at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had an abnormal 
return of –11.04%.
3 In dollars, their capitalization fell by slightly more than $8.8 billion. On these 
three days, the banks not exposed to LTCM gained $26.86 billion dollars. As a result, banks with 
LTCM exposure underperformed the non-exposed banks over these three days by 14.24% (p < 
0.01). Perhaps another way to look at the banks exposed to LTCM is the following. The four 
banks had equity of $145 billion on August 26. On September 4, their equity was $102 billion, 
corresponding to a loss of 29.45%. During that period, the banks not exposed to LTCM lost 
9.35% of their value, going from $596 billion to $540 billion. What we call exposure to LTCM 
differs from exposure to foreign countries in that for these exposures banks report a dollar amount   7 
of exposure resulting from transactions with these countries. In contrast, the banks that 
participated in the rescue of LTCM did not report their exposure to LTCM. These banks might 
have lost value simply because the market believed they had proprietary trades similar to those of 
LTCM rather than because of credit exposures to LTCM. These banks lost another 3.59% (p = 
0.03) on September 24, the trading day following the announcement that they were putting money 
into LTCM. On that day, the other banks lost an insignificant 1.02% (p = 0.16).  On September 
23, some exposed banks performed quite well relative to the market and the market itself 
increased significantly. The Citicorp mergers with Travelers Group Inc. was approved by the 
Federal Reserve Board, which led to a large increase in Citicorp's stock price, and the Greenspan 
testimony in front of Congress changed interest rate expectations. The investment banks with 
publicly traded equity that attended the LTCM meeting did not have significant positive abnormal 
returns on that day, so that the good performance of banks appears unrelated to news about 
LTCM.  
  There are three lessons from the LTCM events. First, their economic significance after 
taking into account market movements for exposed banks exceeds the economic significance of 
the crises of Mexico, Korea, Russia, or Brazil. Second, exposed banks did not gain from the 
rescue. Third, despite the magnitude of the exposed bank losses in the LTCM events, the LTCM 
events did not affect non-exposed banks significantly. Thus, the market was perfectly capable of 
distinguishing between banks that were at risk and those that were not three weeks before the 
rescue.  
5. Conclusion.  
  Our analysis shows that, for the events we considered, the market distinguishes well 
between exposed and non-exposed banks. After taking into account market movements, exposed 
banks are affected by events while non-exposed banks are generally not. There is therefore no 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Traveller's was at the meeting instead of Citicorp, but the two had agreed to merge so that we treat them   8 
basis for concerns that markets react similarly across banks and that therefore banks have to be 
protected from the markets. Our evidence raises important questions, especially for those who 
emphasize the importance of U.S. systemic risks as a motivation for bailouts. In particular, if the 
events discussed in this paper had an impact on systemic risk, why is it that we cannot notice such 
an impact on non-exposed banks? One might argue that markets knew that there was no danger 
either because they knew that exposures were insufficient to matter for the U.S. banking system 
in the first place or because they knew that policymakers would always succeed in making sure 
that nothing bad would happen to the financial system. Whatever the explanation for the lack of 
an adverse impact on non-exposed banks, the bottom line must be that the markets did not think 
that any of the adverse events we considered could have led to significant economic problems for 
the banking sector in the U.S. in general. The fact that a subset of banks could lose 29% of their 
equity capitalization in six trading days without more impact on other banks is consistent with at 
least three explanations: (1) systemic risk is overrated, (2) the market underreacted, and/or (3) the 
cleverness of our policymakers is underrated.  
                                                                                                                                                 
as one entity.    9 
 
Table 1. Abnormal returns of the U.S. bank portfolios around events of crises and bailouts 
The daily abnormal returns are estimated using the dummy variable approach described in the text and the regressions 
estimates are in the appendix of the working paper version of the paper. Exposed banks are those that reported a 
positive exposure to the crisis country in their annual report closest to the first event date for a country, whereas non-
exposed banks are the rest of the component banks in the Datastream U.S. retail bank index whose annual reports are 
available from Edgar Archives or their web-sites. We report the sample period in parentheses next to the country and p-
values in brackets beside the abnormal returns.  
 
    Equal-weighted bank portfolio 







(1) – (2) 
Mexico (1/1/94 – 6/30/95: 378 days)   
Devaluation  (941220) -0.204 [0.74] 0.124 [0.76] -0.329 [0.53]
Giving up defense (night)  (941221) -1.369 [0.03]-0.026 [0.95] -1.343 [0.01]
Request for IMF help  (950106)  0.215 [0.73] 0.120 [0.77]  0.095 [0.86]
  (950125)  1.435 [0.02] 0.507 [0.21]  0.927 [0.08]
IMF's support announcement  (950126)  0.483 [0.44] 0.077 [0.85]  0.406 [0.44]
  (950127)  0.501 [0.42] 0.761 [0.06] -0.261 [0.62]
Korea (1/16/97 – 7/15/98: 377 days)   
  (971114) -1.500 [0.07]-0.714 [0.20] -0.785 [0.23]
Giving up defense  (971117)  1.154 [0.17] 0.285 [0.61]  0.869 [0.19]
Request for IMF help  (971121)  0.022 [0.98]-0.396 [0.47]  0.418 [0.53]
IMF's support announcement  (971201)  2.093 [0.01] 1.221 [0.03]  0.872 [0.19]
IMF's support announcement  (971204)  1.253 [0.13] 0.886 [0.11]  0.367 [0.58]
Russia (1/1/98 - 4/9/99: 319 days)     
Request for additional IMF help  (980619)  0.610 [0.66] 0.307 [0.68]  0.303 [0.81]
IMF's approval of pre-assigned loan  (980625)  0.062 [0.96] 0.737 [0.33] -0.675 [0.59]
IMF's additional support announcement (980713)  0.382 [0.78]-0.064 [0.93]  0.446 [0.72]
Devaluation  (980817)  0.112 [0.94]-1.395 [0.06]  1.508 [0.24]
  (980827) -4.194 [0.00]-0.704 [0.36] -3.491 [0.01]
Suspension of Ruble trading  (980828) -2.108 [0.13] 0.349 [0.64] -2.457 [0.05]
  (980831)  3.445 [0.02] 1.653 [0.04]  1.792 [0.18]
Brazil (1/1/98 – 4/9/99: 319 days)   
  (980902)  1.543 [0.18] 3.553 [0.00] -2.010 [0.04]
Outflows threaten fx  (980903) -4.572 [0.00]-0.628 [0.36] -3.945 [0.00]
Opening of negotiation with IMF  (980915)  1.953 [0.09] 0.923 [0.18]  1.030 [0.29]
Joint statement of IMF and Brazil  (981008)  3.457 [0.00]-2.436 [0.00]  5.893 [0.00]
IMF's support announcement  (981113)  2.531 [0.03] 0.140 [0.84]  2.391 [0.01]
Devaluation  (990113) -0.529 [0.65]-0.458 [0.50] -0.071 [0.94]
Giving up defense  (990115)  1.563 [0.18] 0.087 [0.90]  1.476 [0.13]
  (990119) -2.433 [0.04]-1.217 [0.08]    -1.216 [0.21]
LTCM (1/1/98 – 4/9/99: 319 days)   
  (980901) -3.466 [0.03] 0.477 [0.51] -3.943 [0.01]
News of LTCM's loss  (980902)  0.522 [0.74] 3.422 [0.00] -2.899 [0.05]
  (980903) -7.985 [0.00]-0.682 [0.35] -7.303 [0.00]
  (980923)  4.108 [0.01] -0.003 [1.00]  4.11[0.01]
Rescue accord at the FED (23 night)  (980924) -3.587 [0.03]-1.024 [0.16] -2.563 [0.09]
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Table 1. Abnormal returns of the equally-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Mexican crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1) : EW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=74) 
(2) : EW of banks whose 1994 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=50) 
(3) : EW of banks with Mexican exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=9) 
(4) : EW of banks without Mexican exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=41) 
(5) : EW of banks with Latin exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=10) 
(6) : EW of banks without Latin exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=40). 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4)     (5)     (6)     (5) - (6) 
Intercept     0.017 [0.38]    0.012 [0.56]    0.005 [0.46]   -0.006 [0.85]    0.017 [0.44]   -0.023 [0.40]   -0.002 [0.94]    0.016 [0.45]   -0.019 [0.47] 
Excess return of US market    0.757 [0.00]    0.818 [0.00]    -0.062 [0.00]    1.100 [0.00]    0.757 [0.00]    0.343 [0.00]    1.065 [0.00]    0.757 [0.00]    0.308 [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.008 [0.56]    -0.003 [0.81]    -0.004 [0.30]    -0.024 [0.30]    0.001 [0.95]    -0.024 [0.20]    -0.025 [0.23]    0.002 [0.89]    -0.027 [0.13] 
  (941219)    0.489 [0.19]    0.674 [0.10]    -0.185 [0.12]    0.911 [0.14]    0.622 [0.13]    0.289 [0.58]    0.964 [0.10]    0.601 [0.15]    0.363 [0.46] 
Devaluation  (941220)    0.130 [0.73]    0.065 [0.87]    0.065 [0.59]    -0.204 [0.74]    0.124 [0.76]    -0.329 [0.53]    -0.014 [0.98]    0.085 [0.84]    -0.099 [0.84] 
Giving up defense (night)  (941221)    -0.265 [0.48]    -0.268 [0.51]    0.002 [0.98]    -1.369 [0.03]    -0.026 [0.95]    -1.343 [0.01]    -1.362 [0.02]    0.006 [0.99]    -1.368 [0.01] 
  (941222)    -0.553 [0.14]    -0.813 [0.05]    0.260 [0.03]    -0.594 [0.34]    -0.861 [0.04]    0.267 [0.61]    -0.671 [0.25]    -0.848 [0.04]    0.177 [0.72] 
  (941223)    0.020 [0.96]    0.037 [0.93]    -0.017 [0.90]    0.600 [0.37]    -0.087 [0.84]    0.687 [0.23]    0.490 [0.44]    -0.076 [0.86]    0.567 [0.29] 
  (950105)    -0.148 [0.69]    -0.155 [0.70]    0.007 [0.96]    -0.108 [0.86]    -0.165 [0.69]    0.058 [0.91]    -0.180 [0.76]    -0.149 [0.72]    -0.031 [0.95] 
Request for IMF help  (950106)    0.216 [0.57]    0.137 [0.74]    0.078 [0.51]    0.215 [0.73]    0.120 [0.77]    0.095 [0.86]    0.194 [0.74]    0.123 [0.77]    0.071 [0.89] 
  (950109)    -0.040 [0.92]    -0.174 [0.67]    0.134 [0.26]    -0.489 [0.43]    -0.105 [0.80]    -0.384 [0.46]    -0.475 [0.42]    -0.099 [0.81]    -0.377 [0.45] 
  (950125)    0.463 [0.22]    0.674 [0.10]    -0.212 [0.08]    1.435 [0.02]    0.507 [0.21]    0.927 [0.08]    1.455 [0.01]    0.479 [0.25]    0.976 [0.05] 
IMF's support announcement  (950126)    -0.004 [0.99]    0.150 [0.71]    -0.154 [0.20]    0.483 [0.44]    0.077 [0.85]    0.406 [0.44]    0.238 [0.69]    0.128 [0.76]    0.110 [0.82] 
   (950127)     0.550 [0.14]    0.715 [0.08]   -0.164 [0.17]    0.501 [0.42]    0.761 [0.06]   -0.261 [0.62]    0.413 [0.48]    0.790 [0.06]   -0.377 [0.45] 
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Table 2. Abnormal returns of the equally-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Korean crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : EW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78) 
(2)  : EW of banks whose 1997 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=76) 
(3)  : EW of banks with Korean exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=10) 
(4)  : EW of banks without Korean exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=66) 
(5)  : EW of banks with Asian exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=15) 
(6)  : EW of banks without Asian exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=61) 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4)     (5)     (6)     (5) - (6) 
Intercept     0.031  [0.28]    0.031 [0.29]    0.000 [0.75]    -0.002 [0.96]    0.036 [0.21]    -0.038 [0.27]     0.004  [0.92]    0.038 [0.19]    -0.034 [0.20] 
Excess return of US market    0.862  [0.00]    0.870 [0.00]    -0.008 [0.00]    1.076  [0.00]    0.839 [0.00]    0.237 [0.00]    1.032  [0.00]    0.830 [0.00]    0.201 [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    0.015  [0.44]    0.013 [0.48]    0.001 [0.15]    -0.006 [0.83]    0.016 [0.39]    -0.023 [0.32]    0.002  [0.93]    0.016 [0.39]    -0.014 [0.42] 
  (971114)   -0.806 [0.14]    -0.818 [0.14]    0.011 [0.66]    -1.500 [0.07]    -0.714 [0.20]    -0.785 [0.23]    -1.541 [0.03]    -0.640 [0.24]    -0.901 [0.07] 
Giving up defense  (971117)   0.413  [0.46]    0.399 [0.47]    0.013 [0.61]    1.154  [0.17]    0.285 [0.61]    0.869 [0.19]    0.881  [0.23]    0.281 [0.61]    0.601 [0.24] 
  (971118)   0.576  [0.30]    0.590 [0.29]    -0.014 [0.60]    0.456  [0.59]    0.610 [0.27]    -0.155 [0.81]    0.656  [0.37]    0.574 [0.30]    0.082 [0.87] 
  (971120)   0.249  [0.65]    0.209 [0.71]    0.041 [0.12]    -0.411 [0.62]    0.302 [0.58]    -0.714 [0.28]    0.220  [0.76]    0.206 [0.71]    0.014 [0.98] 
Request for IMF help  (971121)   -0.339 [0.54]    -0.341 [0.54]    0.003 [0.92]    0.022  [0.98]    -0.396 [0.47]    0.418 [0.53]    -0.229 [0.75]    -0.369 [0.50]    0.140 [0.78] 
  (971124)   0.226  [0.68]    0.281 [0.61]    -0.055 [0.03]    -0.287 [0.73]    0.367 [0.51]    -0.654 [0.32]    0.110  [0.88]    0.323 [0.56]    -0.213 [0.67] 
  (971128)   0.014  [0.98]    0.017 [0.98]    -0.003 [0.89]    -0.028 [0.97]    0.024 [0.97]    -0.052 [0.94]    -0.139 [0.85]    0.056 [0.92]    -0.195 [0.70] 
IMF's support announcement (971201)   1.305  [0.02]    1.335 [0.02]    -0.030 [0.24]    2.093  [0.01]    1.221 [0.03]    0.872 [0.19]    2.018  [0.01]    1.167 [0.03]    0.851 [0.09] 
  (971202)   0.732  [0.18]    0.727 [0.19]    0.005 [0.84]    0.272  [0.74]    0.795 [0.15]    -0.523 [0.43]    0.423  [0.56]    0.801 [0.14]    -0.378 [0.45] 
  (971203)   0.727  [0.19]    0.772 [0.16]    -0.045 [0.08]    0.186  [0.82]    0.861 [0.12]    -0.675 [0.31]    0.383  [0.60]    0.868 [0.11]    -0.485 [0.34] 
IMF's support announcement (971204)   0.915  [0.10]    0.934 [0.09]    -0.019 [0.46]    1.253  [0.13]    0.886 [0.11]    0.367 [0.58]    1.658  [0.02]    0.756 [0.17]    0.902 [0.07] 
   (971205)    0.276  [0.62]    0.271 [0.62]    0.006 [0.83]     0.953  [0.26]    0.168 [0.76]    0.785 [0.23]     0.686  [0.35]    0.169 [0.76]    0.518 [0.31] 
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Table 3. Abnormal returns of the equally-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Russian crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the changes in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : EW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78/77/76*) 
(2)  : EW of banks whose 1998 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=74/73/73**) 
(3)  : EW of banks with Russian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=7/6/6**) 
(4)  : EW of banks without Russian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=67) 
 
* Citicorp is dropped out after 10/7/98 and Crestar is dropped out after 12/31/98. 
** Citicorp is in the sample up to 10/7/98 while Crestar is out of the sample during the sample period. 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4) 
Intercept    -0.116 [0.01]    -0.116 [0.01]    0.000  [0.97]    -0.093 [0.24]    -0.117 [0.01]    0.024  [0.74] 
Excess return of US market    1.056  [0.00]    1.072  [0.00]    -0.016 [0.00]    1.330  [0.00]    1.047  [0.00]    0.284  [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.032 [0.35]    -0.030 [0.38]    -0.002 [0.48]    -0.090 [0.15]    -0.025 [0.47]    -0.065 [0.26] 
  (980618)    -0.996 [0.18]    -0.994 [0.18]    -0.003 [0.96]    -0.044 [0.97]    -1.094 [0.15]    1.050  [0.41] 
Request for additional IMF help  (980619)    0.315  [0.67]    0.336  [0.65]    -0.022 [0.67]    0.610  [0.66]    0.307  [0.68]    0.303  [0.81] 
  (980622)    -0.183 [0.81]    -0.248 [0.74]    0.065  [0.21]    -1.219 [0.38]    -0.146 [0.85]    -1.073 [0.40] 
  (980624)    0.295  [0.69]    0.343  [0.65]    -0.047 [0.36]    1.768  [0.20]    0.192  [0.80]    1.576  [0.22] 
IMF's approval of pre-assigned loan  (980625)    0.658  [0.38]    0.674  [0.37]    -0.016 [0.76]    0.062  [0.96]    0.737  [0.33]    -0.675 [0.59] 
  (980626)    -0.125 [0.87]    -0.125 [0.87]    0.000  [0.99]    -0.220 [0.87]    -0.116 [0.88]    -0.104 [0.93] 
  (980710)    0.086  [0.91]    0.067  [0.93]    0.019  [0.72]    0.730  [0.60]    -0.003 [1.00]    0.733  [0.56] 
IMF's additional support announcement  (980713)    -0.002 [1.00]    -0.021 [0.98]    0.019  [0.71]    0.382  [0.78]    -0.064 [0.93]    0.446  [0.72] 
  (980714)    0.244  [0.74]    0.228  [0.76]    0.016  [0.75]    1.236  [0.37]    0.121  [0.87]    1.115  [0.38] 
  (980814)    0.518  [0.49]    0.501  [0.50]    0.016  [0.75]    1.411  [0.31]    0.406  [0.59]    1.005  [0.43] 
Devaluation  (980817)    -1.284 [0.09]    -1.250 [0.10]    -0.034 [0.51]    0.112  [0.94]    -1.395 [0.06]    1.508  [0.24] 
  (980818)    0.359  [0.63]    0.405  [0.59]    -0.046 [0.37]    0.308  [0.82]    0.412  [0.58]    -0.105 [0.93] 
  (980827)    -1.157 [0.13]    -1.036 [0.17]    -0.121 [0.02]    -4.194 [0.00]    -0.704 [0.36]    -3.491 [0.01] 
Suspension of ruble trading  (980828)    0.104  [0.89]    0.115  [0.88]    -0.012 [0.82]    -2.108 [0.13]    0.349  [0.64]    -2.457 [0.05] 
   (980831)     1.747  [0.03]     1.816  [0.02]     -0.070 [0.20]     3.445  [0.02]     1.653  [0.04]     1.792  [0.18]   15 
Table 4. Abnormal returns of the equally-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Brazilian crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : EW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78/77/76*) 
(2)  : EW of banks whose 1998 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=74/73/73**) 
(3)  : EW of banks with Brazilian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=10/9/9**) 
(4)  : EW of banks without Brazilian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=64) 
(5)  : EW of banks with Brazilian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports but without LTCM exposures based on the FED meeting (N=6) 
(6)  : EW of banks with Latin exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=14/13/13**) 
(7)  : EW of banks without Latin exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=60) 
 
* Citicorp is dropped out after 10/7/98 and Crestar is dropped out after 12/31/98. 
** Citicorp is in the sample up to 10/7/98 while Crestar is out of the sample during the sample period. 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4)     (5)     (5) - (4)     (3) - (5)     (6)     (7)     (6) - (7) 
Intercept     -0.123 [0.00]     -0.121 [0.00]     -0.001 [0.62]     -0.091 [0.17]     -0.125 [0.00]     0.034  [0.54]     -0.092 [0.15]     0.033  [0.52]     0.001  [0.97]     -0.109 [0.05]     -0.124 [0.00]     0.015  [0.73] 
Excess return of US market    1.001  [0.00]    1.017  [0.00]    -0.015 [0.00]    1.256  [0.00]    0.980  [0.00]    0.275  [0.00]    1.222  [0.00]    0.241  [0.00]    0.034  [0.15]    1.141  [0.00]    0.988  [0.00]    0.152  [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.028 [0.37]    -0.028 [0.38]    0.000  [0.93]    -0.097 [0.07]    -0.019 [0.56]    -0.079 [0.08]    -0.087 [0.09]    -0.069 [0.10]    -0.010 [0.68]    -0.067 [0.14]    -0.020 [0.53]    -0.048 [0.17] 
  (980902)    3.312  [0.00]    3.281  [0.00]    0.031  [0.54]    1.543  [0.18]    3.553  [0.00]    -2.010 [0.04]    2.276  [0.04]    -1.277 [0.16]    -0.733 [0.15]    2.138  [0.03]    3.548  [0.00]    -1.410 [0.06] 
Dollar's pour-out  (980903)    -1.099 [0.11]    -1.161 [0.09]    0.062  [0.22]    -4.572 [0.00]    -0.628 [0.36]    -3.945 [0.00]    -2.179 [0.05]    -1.552 [0.08]    -2.393 [0.00]    -3.325 [0.00]    -0.656 [0.34]    -2.669 [0.00] 
  (980904)    -0.310 [0.65]    -0.249 [0.72]    -0.061 [0.23]    -1.826 [0.12]    -0.001 [1.00]    -1.825 [0.06]    -1.267 [0.26]    -1.266 [0.16]    -0.559 [0.27]    -1.290 [0.19]    -0.005 [0.99]    -1.285 [0.09] 
  (980914)    0.823  [0.23]    0.883  [0.20]    -0.060 [0.24]    -0.190 [0.87]    1.049  [0.13]    -1.239 [0.20]    -0.095 [0.93]    -1.144 [0.21]    -0.095 [0.85]    0.375  [0.70]    1.001  [0.15]    -0.626 [0.41] 
Opening of negotiation with IMF  (980915)    1.103  [0.11]    1.065  [0.12]    0.039  [0.44]    1.953  [0.09]    0.923  [0.18]    1.030  [0.29]    2.175  [0.05]    1.252  [0.16]    -0.222 [0.66]    1.828  [0.06]    0.885  [0.20]    0.943  [0.21] 
  (980916)    0.777  [0.26]    0.906  [0.19]    -0.129 [0.01]    0.564  [0.63]    0.958  [0.16]    -0.394 [0.68]    0.564  [0.61]    -0.394 [0.66]    0.000  [1.00]    0.517  [0.60]    0.996  [0.15]    -0.479 [0.52] 
  (981007)    -1.400 [0.04]    -1.420 [0.04]    0.020  [0.70]    -1.704 [0.14]    -1.375 [0.05]    -0.329 [0.73]    -0.512 [0.65]    0.863  [0.34]    -1.192 [0.02]    -1.524 [0.12]    -1.396 [0.04]    -0.129 [0.86] 
Joint statement of IMF and Brazil  (981008)    -1.712 [0.01]    -1.706 [0.01]    -0.005 [0.91]    3.457  [0.00]    -2.436 [0.00]    5.893  [0.00]    1.161  [0.30]    3.596  [0.00]    2.296  [0.00]    0.710  [0.47]    -2.232 [0.00]    2.941  [0.00] 
  (981009)    3.420  [0.00]    3.271  [0.00]    0.148  [0.00]    1.777  [0.13]    3.488  [0.00]    -1.711 [0.08]    1.355  [0.23]    -2.133 [0.02]    0.422  [0.41]    2.403  [0.02]    3.463  [0.00]    -1.060 [0.16] 
  (981112)    0.174  [0.80]    0.213  [0.76]    -0.039 [0.44]    -0.448 [0.70]    0.305  [0.66]    -0.753 [0.43]    -0.224 [0.84]    -0.529 [0.56]    -0.224 [0.66]    -0.340 [0.73]    0.332  [0.63]    -0.672 [0.37] 
IMF's support announcement  (981113)    0.494  [0.47]    0.434  [0.53]    0.060  [0.24]    2.531  [0.03]    0.140  [0.84]    2.391  [0.01]    2.276  [0.04]    2.136  [0.02]    0.255  [0.62]    2.065  [0.04]    0.081  [0.91]    1.984  [0.01] 
  (981116)    0.107  [0.88]    0.086  [0.90]    0.021  [0.67]    0.618  [0.59]    0.013  [0.98]    0.605  [0.53]    0.717  [0.52]    0.704  [0.43]    -0.099 [0.85]    0.237  [0.81]    0.054  [0.94]    0.183  [0.81] 
  (990112)    0.619  [0.37]    0.550  [0.43]    0.069  [0.17]    -0.332 [0.77]    0.669  [0.33]    -1.001 [0.30]    -0.686 [0.54]    -1.355 [0.13]    0.354  [0.49]    -0.059 [0.95]    0.679  [0.33]    -0.738 [0.33] 
Devaluation  (990113)    -0.549 [0.42]    -0.466 [0.50]    -0.084 [0.10]    -0.529 [0.65]    -0.458 [0.50]    -0.071 [0.94]    0.349  [0.76]    0.807  [0.37]    -0.878 [0.09]    -0.357 [0.72]    -0.490 [0.48]    0.133  [0.86] 
  (990114)    -0.455 [0.51]    -0.472 [0.50]    0.017  [0.73]    -1.538 [0.19]    -0.326 [0.63]    -1.211 [0.21]    -1.836 [0.10]    -1.509 [0.09]    0.298  [0.56]    -0.903 [0.36]    -0.381 [0.58]    -0.522 [0.49] 
Giving up defense  (990115)    0.319  [0.64]    0.264  [0.70]    0.055  [0.28]    1.563  [0.18]    0.087  [0.90]    1.476  [0.13]    2.045  [0.07]    1.958  [0.03]    -0.482 [0.35]    1.321  [0.18]    0.039  [0.96]    1.282  [0.09] 
   (990119)     -1.333 [0.05]     -1.369 [0.05]     0.036  [0.48]     -2.433 [0.04]     -1.217 [0.08]     -1.216 [0.21]     -3.603 [0.00]     -2.385 [0.01]     1.169  [0.02]     -2.056 [0.04]     -1.219 [0.08]     -0.837 [0.27] 
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Table 5. Abnormal returns of the equally-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the LTCM events 
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where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  includes the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate, the change in the Federal Fund rate, and the change in the 30-Year Treasury 
Bond rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th 
event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : EW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78/77/76*) 
(2)  : EW of banks with LTCM exposures based on the FED meeting for the bailout (N=4/3/3*) 
(3)  : EW of banks without LTCM exposures based on the FED meeting for the bailout (N=74/74/73*) 
 
* Citicorp is dropped out after 10/7/98 and Crestar is dropped out after 12/31/98. 
 
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (2) - (3) 
Intercept     -0.114 [0.01]     -0.032 [0.73]     -0.117 [0.00]     0.085  [0.31] 
Excess return of US market    1.017  [0.00]    1.245  [0.00]    1.005  [0.00]    0.240  [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.029 [0.39]    -0.117 [0.11]    -0.025 [0.45]    -0.092 [0.18] 
Federal Fund rate change    -0.009 [0.34]    0.038  [0.07]    -0.011 [0.25]    0.049  [0.01] 
30-year Treasury Bond rate change    0.066  [0.16]    0.516  [0.00]    0.046  [0.33]    0.470  [0.00] 
  (980901)    0.280  [0.70]    -3.466 [0.03]    0.477  [0.51]    -3.943 [0.01] 
News of LTCM's loss  (980902)    3.272  [0.00]    0.522  [0.74]    3.422  [0.00]    -2.899 [0.05] 
  (980903)    -1.057 [0.14]    -7.985 [0.00]    -0.682 [0.35]    -7.303 [0.00] 
  (980923)    0.212  [0.77]    4.108  [0.01]    -0.003 [1.00]    4.111  [0.01] 
Rescue accord at the FED (23 
night)  (980924)    -1.156 [0.11]    -3.587 [0.03]    -1.024 [0.16]    -2.563 [0.09] 
   (980925)     -0.003 [1.00]     -0.022 [0.99]     -0.002 [1.00]     -0.020 [0.99] 
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Table 6. Abnormal returns of the value-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Mexican crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1) : VW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=74) 
(2) : VW of banks whose 1994 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=50) 
(3) : VW of banks with Mexican exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=9) 
(4) : VW of banks without Mexican exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=41) 
(5) : VW of banks with Latin exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=10) 
(6) : VW of banks without Latin exposures based on their 1994 annual reports (N=40). 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4)     (5)     (6)     (5) - (6) 
Intercept     0.012  [0.66]    0.005 [0.86]    0.006 [0.07]     0.009  [0.82]    0.002  [0.94]    0.007 [0.83]    0.010 [0.80]     0.001  [0.96]    0.009 [0.77] 
Excess return of US market    1.052  [0.00]    1.088 [0.00]    -0.036 [0.00]    1.268  [0.00]    0.964  [0.00]    0.304 [0.00]    1.251 [0.00]    0.970  [0.00]    0.281 [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.019 [0.29]    -0.019 [0.33]    0.000 [0.92]    -0.034 [0.21]    -0.010 [0.59]    -0.024 [0.27]    -0.034 [0.20]    -0.009 [0.62]    -0.025 [0.23] 
  (941219)   0.543  [0.28]    0.669 [0.21]    -0.126 [0.06]    0.857  [0.25]    0.538  [0.28]    0.318 [0.59]    0.877 [0.23]    0.515  [0.31]    0.362 [0.53] 
Devaluation  (941220)   -0.131 [0.80]    -0.171 [0.75]    0.041 [0.55]    -0.257 [0.73]    -0.111 [0.82]    -0.146 [0.81]    -0.187 [0.80]    -0.159 [0.75]    -0.028 [0.96] 
Giving up defense (night)  (941221)   -0.894 [0.08]    -1.026 [0.06]    0.132 [0.05]    -1.483 [0.05]    -0.714 [0.15]    -0.769 [0.20]    -1.476 [0.04]    -0.698 [0.17]    -0.778 [0.18] 
  (941222)   -1.043 [0.04]    -1.157 [0.03]    0.114 [0.09]    -1.619 [0.03]    -0.845 [0.09]    -0.775 [0.19]    -1.610 [0.03]    -0.831 [0.10]    -0.779 [0.18] 
  (941223)   0.301  [0.58]    0.385 [0.51]    -0.084 [0.25]    1.099  [0.17]    -0.093 [0.86]    1.192 [0.06]    1.041 [0.19]    -0.082 [0.88]    1.123 [0.07] 
  (950105)   0.054  [0.92]    0.143 [0.79]    -0.089 [0.19]    0.210  [0.78]    0.098  [0.84]    0.112 [0.85]    0.173 [0.81]    0.122  [0.81]    0.051 [0.93] 
Request for IMF help  (950106)   0.042  [0.93]    0.025 [0.96]    0.017 [0.81]    0.028  [0.97]    0.023  [0.96]    0.006 [0.99]    0.027 [0.97]    0.023  [0.96]    0.004 [0.99] 
  (950109)   -0.207 [0.68]    -0.277 [0.60]    0.070 [0.30]    -0.361 [0.63]    -0.220 [0.66]    -0.141 [0.81]    -0.361 [0.62]    -0.217 [0.67]    -0.145 [0.80] 
  (950125)   1.061  [0.04]    1.197 [0.03]    -0.136 [0.04]    1.476  [0.05]    1.012  [0.04]    0.464 [0.43]    1.481 [0.04]    0.996  [0.05]    0.486 [0.40] 
IMF's support announcement (950126)   0.355  [0.48]    0.458 [0.39]    -0.102 [0.13]    0.301  [0.69]    0.564  [0.26]    -0.263 [0.66]    0.220 [0.76]    0.628  [0.21]    -0.408 [0.48] 
   (950127)    0.436  [0.39]    0.434 [0.42]    0.002 [0.97]     0.401  [0.59]    0.458  [0.36]   -0.056 [0.92]    0.373 [0.61]     0.479  [0.34]   -0.105 [0.86] 
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Table 7. Abnormal returns of the value-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Korean crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : VW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78) 
(2)  : VW of banks whose 1997 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=76) 
(3)  : VW of banks with Korean exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=10) 
(4)  : VW of banks without Korean exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=66) 
(5)  : VW of banks with Asian exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=15) 
(6)  : VW of banks without Asian exposures based on their 1997 annual reports (N=61) 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4)     (5)     (6)     (5) - (6) 
Intercept    0.019 [0.61]    0.018 [0.62]    0.000 [0.15]    0.003 [0.96]    0.027 [0.40]    -0.024 [0.56]    0.004 [0.94]    0.029 [0.36]    -0.026 [0.48] 
Excess return of US market    1.092 [0.00]    1.096 [0.00]    -0.004[0.00]    1.227 [0.00]    1.011 [0.00]    0.215 [0.00]    1.190 [0.00]    1.015 [0.00]    0.175 [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    0.003 [0.88]    0.003 [0.89]    0.000 [0.24]    0.004 [0.92]    0.002 [0.92]    0.002 [0.95]    0.005 [0.87]    0.001 [0.97]    0.004 [0.85] 
  (971114)   -1.029[0.14]    -1.035[0.14]    0.006 [0.38]    -2.397[0.02]    -0.225 [0.71]    -2.172 [0.01]    -2.226 [0.02]    -0.086 [0.89]    -2.140 [0.00] 
Giving up defense  (971117)   0.803 [0.25]    0.803 [0.25]    0.001 [0.93]    1.702 [0.10]    0.276 [0.65]    1.426 [0.07]    1.555 [0.10]    0.208 [0.74]    1.347 [0.05] 
  (971118)   0.369 [0.60]    0.371 [0.60]    -0.002[0.76]    0.091 [0.93]    0.532 [0.38]    -0.442 [0.58]    0.283 [0.76]    0.437 [0.48]    -0.154 [0.82] 
  (971120)   0.024 [0.97]    0.014 [0.98]    0.010 [0.12]    -0.582[0.57]    0.378 [0.53]    -0.959 [0.23]    -0.356 [0.70]    0.317 [0.61]    -0.673 [0.33] 
Request for IMF help  (971121)   -0.453[0.51]    -0.454[0.52]    0.001 [0.84]    0.091 [0.93]    -0.778 [0.20]    0.869 [0.27]    -0.033 [0.97]    -0.791 [0.20]    0.758 [0.27] 
  (971124)   0.127 [0.86]    0.140 [0.84]    -0.012[0.05]    -0.406[0.69]    0.452 [0.46]    -0.857 [0.28]    -0.174 [0.85]    0.382 [0.54]    -0.557 [0.42] 
  (971128)   -0.052[0.94]    -0.049[0.94]    -0.003[0.62]    -0.038[0.97]    -0.053 [0.93]    0.015 [0.98]    -0.075 [0.94]    -0.027 [0.96]    -0.048 [0.94] 
IMF's support announcement (971201)   1.482 [0.03]    1.487 [0.03]    -0.005[0.40]    2.408 [0.02]    0.959 [0.12]    1.449 [0.07]    2.176 [0.02]    0.951 [0.12]    1.226 [0.08] 
  (971202)   0.614 [0.38]    0.614 [0.38]    0.000 [0.95]    0.027 [0.98]    0.952 [0.12]    -0.925 [0.24]    0.222 [0.81]    0.919 [0.13]    -0.696 [0.31] 
  (971203)   0.379 [0.59]    0.387 [0.58]    -0.008[0.22]    0.138 [0.89]    0.535 [0.38]    -0.397 [0.62]    0.236 [0.80]    0.508 [0.41]    -0.272 [0.69] 
IMF's support announcement (971204)   0.898 [0.20]    0.904 [0.20]    -0.006[0.33]    1.677 [0.10]    0.453 [0.46]    1.224 [0.12]    1.674 [0.07]    0.295 [0.63]    1.379 [0.05] 
   (971205)    0.112 [0.87]    0.110 [0.88]    0.002 [0.74]    0.358 [0.73]   -0.030 [0.96]    0.388 [0.63]    0.271 [0.77]   -0.014 [0.98]    0.285 [0.68] 
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Table 8. Abnormal returns of the value-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Russian crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or 
zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : VW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78/77/76*) 
(2)  : VW of banks whose 1998 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=74/73/73**) 
(3)  : VW of banks with Russian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=7/6/6**) 
(4)  : VW of banks without Russian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=67) 
 
* Citicorp is dropped out after 10/7/98 and Crestar is dropped out after 12/31/98. 
** Citicorp is in the sample up to 10/7/98 while Crestar is out of the sample during the sample period. 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4) 
Intercept    -0.094[0.07]    -0.095[0.07]    0.001 [0.36]    -0.089[0.34]    -0.099[0.03]    0.010 [0.90] 
Excess return of US market    1.266 [0.00]    1.270 [0.00]    -0.004[0.00]    1.485 [0.00]    1.184 [0.00]    0.301 [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.046[0.27]    -0.046[0.27]    0.000 [0.77]    -0.115[0.12]    -0.022[0.55]    -0.093[0.14] 
  (980618)    -0.272[0.77]    -0.261[0.78]    -0.011[0.41]    0.158 [0.92]    -0.459[0.57]    0.617 [0.66] 
Request for additional IMF help  (980619)    0.444 [0.63]    0.456 [0.62]    -0.012[0.36]    0.749 [0.65]    0.325 [0.69]    0.424 [0.76] 
  (980622)    -0.955[0.30]    -0.972[0.29]    0.017 [0.20]    -1.339[0.41]    -0.787[0.33]    -0.552[0.69] 
  (980624)    1.211 [0.19]    1.237 [0.18]    -0.027[0.04]    2.061 [0.21]    0.830 [0.31]    1.232 [0.38] 
IMF's approval of pre-assigned loan  (980625)    0.655 [0.47]    0.657 [0.47]    -0.002[0.88]    0.103 [0.95]    0.929 [0.25]    -0.826[0.55] 
  (980626)    -0.234[0.80]    -0.226[0.80]    -0.008[0.57]    -0.197[0.90]    -0.245[0.76]    0.048 [0.97] 
  (980710)    0.584 [0.52]    0.582 [0.52]    0.002 [0.86]    0.915 [0.57]    0.419 [0.60]    0.495 [0.72] 
IMF's additional support announcement  (980713)    0.033 [0.97]    0.034 [0.97]    -0.001[0.96]    0.349 [0.83]    -0.120[0.88]    0.469 [0.74] 
  (980714)    0.531 [0.56]    0.531 [0.56]    0.001 [0.94]    0.613 [0.71]    0.473 [0.56]    0.140 [0.92] 
  (980814)    0.315 [0.73]    0.309 [0.74]    0.006 [0.65]    1.180 [0.47]    -0.092[0.91]    1.272 [0.36] 
Devaluation  (980817)    -0.506[0.58]    -0.488[0.60]    -0.018[0.16]    0.653 [0.69]    -1.079[0.18]    1.732 [0.21] 
  (980818)    0.248 [0.79]    0.264 [0.77]    -0.016[0.24]    0.122 [0.94]    0.302 [0.71]    -0.179[0.90] 
  (980827)    -0.907[0.33]    -0.907[0.33]    0.000 [0.99]    -3.023[0.07]    0.123 [0.88]    -3.147[0.03] 
Suspension of ruble trading  (980828)    0.177 [0.85]    0.179 [0.85]    -0.002[0.87]    -1.335[0.41]    0.886 [0.28]    -2.221[0.11] 
   (980831)     3.103 [0.00]     3.129 [0.00]     -0.026[0.06]     3.473 [0.04]     3.049 [0.00]     0.423 [0.77]   20 
Table 9. Abnormal returns of the value-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the Brazilian crisis 








where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of one-
day return on the 7-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  is the change in the 7-day Eurodollar rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or zero 
otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : VW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78/77/76*) 
(2)  : VW of banks whose 1998 annual reports are available in the Edgar Archives or their web-sites (N=74/73/73**) 
(3)  : VW of banks with Brazilian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=10/9/9**) 
(4)  : VW of banks without Brazilian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=64) 
(5)  : VW of banks with Brazilian exposures based on their 1998 annual reports but without LTCM exposures based on the FED meeting (N=6) 
(6)  : VW of banks with Latin exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=14/13/13**) 
(7)  : VW of banks without Latin exposures based on their 1998 annual reports (N=60) 
 
* Citicorp is dropped out after 10/7/98 and Crestar is dropped out after 12/31/98. 
** Citicorp is in the sample up to 10/7/98 while Crestar is out of the sample during the sample period. 
 
         (1)     (2)     (1) - (2)     (3)     (4)     (3) - (4)     (5)     (5) - (4)     (3) - (5)     (6)     (7)     (6) - (7) 
Intercept     -0.083 [0.10]     -0.083 [0.10]     0.000  [0.75]     -0.063 [0.43]     -0.097 [0.03]     0.033  [0.61]     -0.070 [0.37]     0.027  [0.66]     0.007  [0.87]     -0.066 [0.39]     -0.096 [0.03]     0.031  [0.62] 
Excess return of US market    1.190  [0.00]    1.194  [0.00]    -0.004 [0.00]    1.364  [0.00]    1.098  [0.00]    0.266  [0.00]    1.283  [0.00]    0.184  [0.00]    0.082  [0.01]    1.341  [0.00]    1.103  [0.00]    0.238  [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.043 [0.29]    -0.043 [0.29]    0.000  [0.62]    -0.111 [0.08]    -0.009 [0.79]    -0.102 [0.05]    -0.092 [0.14]    -0.082 [0.10]    -0.020 [0.52]    -0.107 [0.08]    -0.008 [0.82]    -0.099 [0.05] 
  (980902)    2.403  [0.01]    2.387  [0.01]    0.017  [0.21]    1.918  [0.17]    2.667  [0.00]    -0.749 [0.51]    2.845  [0.04]    0.177  [0.87]    -0.927 [0.17]    2.019  [0.13]    2.630  [0.00]    -0.611 [0.57] 
Dollar's pour-out  (980903)    -1.643 [0.06]    -1.660 [0.06]    0.016  [0.21]    -4.716 [0.00]    0.041  [0.96]    -4.757 [0.00]    -1.458 [0.28]    -1.499 [0.16]    -3.258 [0.00]    -4.497 [0.00]    0.085  [0.91]    -4.582 [0.00] 
  (980904)    -1.867 [0.03]    -1.875 [0.03]    0.008  [0.54]    -3.294 [0.02]    -1.101 [0.15]    -2.194 [0.05]    -2.227 [0.10]    -1.126 [0.30]    -1.067 [0.11]    -3.099 [0.02]    -1.135 [0.14]    -1.964 [0.07] 
  (980914)    0.441  [0.62]    0.438  [0.62]    0.002  [0.86]    0.095  [0.95]    0.638  [0.41]    -0.542 [0.63]    0.197  [0.88]    -0.440 [0.68]    -0.102 [0.88]    0.204  [0.88]    0.591  [0.44]    -0.387 [0.72] 
Opening of negotiation with IMF  (980915)    1.361  [0.12]    1.344  [0.13]    0.017  [0.19]    1.697  [0.22]    1.145  [0.14]    0.552  [0.63]    1.029  [0.45]    -0.116 [0.91]    0.668  [0.32]    1.661  [0.21]    1.146  [0.14]    0.515  [0.63] 
  (980916)    0.926  [0.29]    0.950  [0.28]    -0.023 [0.08]    0.246  [0.86]    1.341  [0.08]    -1.095 [0.33]    1.052  [0.43]    -0.289 [0.79]    -0.806 [0.23]    0.255  [0.85]    1.376  [0.07]    -1.121 [0.30] 
  (981007)    -1.224 [0.16]    -1.222 [0.17]    -0.002 [0.87]    -2.071 [0.14]    -0.726 [0.34]    -1.345 [0.24]    -1.848 [0.17]    -1.122 [0.30]    -0.223 [0.74]    -2.010 [0.13]    -0.718 [0.35]    -1.292 [0.23] 
Joint statement of IMF and Brazil  (981008)    0.603  [0.49]    0.617  [0.48]    -0.014 [0.31]    3.156  [0.02]    -0.681 [0.37]    3.838  [0.00]    2.260  [0.09]    2.941  [0.01]    0.896  [0.18]    2.746  [0.04]    -0.587 [0.45]    3.333  [0.00] 
  (981009)    3.610  [0.00]    3.597  [0.00]    0.012  [0.35]    2.542  [0.07]    4.155  [0.00]    -1.614 [0.16]    3.007  [0.03]    -1.149 [0.29]    -0.465 [0.49]    2.538  [0.06]    4.212  [0.00]    -1.674 [0.12] 
  (981112)    -0.017 [0.98]    -0.017 [0.98]    0.000  [0.98]    -1.106 [0.42]    0.474  [0.53]    -1.580 [0.16]    -0.981 [0.47]    -1.455 [0.18]    -0.125 [0.85]    -1.035 [0.44]    0.492  [0.52]    -1.527 [0.16] 
IMF's support announcement  (981113)    1.231  [0.16]    1.223  [0.16]    0.007  [0.57]    2.883  [0.04]    0.468  [0.54]    2.415  [0.03]    2.986  [0.03]    2.518  [0.02]    -0.103 [0.88]    2.854  [0.03]    0.398  [0.60]    2.457  [0.02] 
  (981116)    0.291  [0.74]    0.300  [0.73]    -0.009 [0.48]    0.788  [0.57]    0.086  [0.91]    0.702  [0.54]    0.995  [0.46]    0.909  [0.40]    -0.207 [0.76]    0.713  [0.59]    0.099  [0.90]    0.614  [0.57] 
  (990112)    -0.175 [0.84]    -0.180 [0.84]    0.005  [0.68]    -0.760 [0.58]    0.082  [0.92]    -0.842 [0.46]    -1.178 [0.38]    -1.259 [0.24]    0.418  [0.54]    -0.700 [0.60]    0.078  [0.92]    -0.778 [0.47] 
Devaluation  (990113)    -0.400 [0.65]    -0.394 [0.65]    -0.006 [0.64]    -1.049 [0.45]    -0.081 [0.92]    -0.967 [0.39]    -0.362 [0.79]    -0.280 [0.79]    -0.687 [0.31]    -1.027 [0.44]    -0.062 [0.94]    -0.965 [0.37] 
  (990114)    -1.138 [0.19]    -1.141 [0.20]    0.003  [0.80]    -1.906 [0.17]    -0.800 [0.30]    -1.107 [0.33]    -2.035 [0.13]    -1.235 [0.25]    0.128  [0.85]    -1.700 [0.20]    -0.870 [0.26]    -0.830 [0.44] 
Giving up defense  (990115)    0.717  [0.41]    0.711  [0.42]    0.006  [0.66]    0.994  [0.48]    0.611  [0.43]    0.383  [0.74]    1.231  [0.36]    0.620  [0.57]    -0.237 [0.73]    0.974  [0.47]    0.606  [0.43]    0.367  [0.73] 
   (990119)     -1.951 [0.03]     -1.958 [0.03]     0.007  [0.59]     -1.524 [0.27]     -2.154 [0.01]     0.629  [0.58]     -2.917 [0.03]     -0.764 [0.48]     1.393  [0.04]     -1.528 [0.25]     -2.174 [0.01]     0.645  [0.55] 
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Table 10. Abnormal returns of the value-weighted U.S. bank portfolios on each day of the LTCM events 
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where  pt R  is the logarithmic daily return on one of the U.S. bank portfolios described below and  mt R  is the Datastream U.S. stock market index return.  Both returns are in excess of the 
one-day return on the seven-day Eurodollar deposit.  t X  includes the change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate, the change in the Federal Fund rate, and the change in the 30-Year Treasury 
Bond rate.   jt f  is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or zero otherwise.  Thus, the parameter estimate  j D  represents an abnormal return for the j-th 
event day. P-values are in brackets. 
(1)  : VW of all banks in the Datastream Banking index (N=78/77/76*) 
(2)  : VW of banks with LTCM exposures based on the FED meeting for the bailout (N=4/3/3*) 
(3)  : VW of banks without LTCM exposures based on the FED meeting for the bailout (N=74/74/73*) 
 
* Citicorp is dropped out after 10/7/98 and Crestar is dropped out after 12/31/98. 
 
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (2) - (3) 
Intercept     -0.071 [0.17]     -0.003 [0.98]     -0.077  [0.11]     0.075  [0.39] 
Excess return of US market    1.202  [0.00]    1.446  [0.00]    1.159  [0.00]    0.287  [0.00] 
7-day Eurodollar rate change    -0.049 [0.23]    -0.169 [0.04]    -0.035  [0.37]    -0.133 [0.06] 
Federal Fund rate change    0.006  [0.63]    0.025  [0.27]    0.003  [0.78]    0.022  [0.27] 
30-year Treasury Bond rate change    0.122  [0.04]    0.440  [0.00]    0.073  [0.19]    0.366  [0.00] 
  (980901)    -0.694 [0.45]    -3.962 [0.03]    -0.047  [0.96]    -3.915 [0.01] 
News of LTCM's loss  (980902)    2.419  [0.01]    0.989  [0.58]    2.731  [0.00]    -1.743 [0.26] 
  (980903)    -1.578 [0.08]    -8.297 [0.00]    -0.258  [0.76]    -8.039 [0.00] 
  (980923)    1.205  [0.18]    3.967  [0.03]    0.642  [0.46]    3.325  [0.03] 
Rescue accord at the FED (23 
night)  (980924)    -1.715 [0.06]    -3.312 [0.06]    -1.410  [0.10]    -1.902 [0.22] 
   (980925)     -0.059 [0.95]     -0.033 [0.99]     -0.061  [0.94]     0.028  [0.99]   22
Table 11. Lists of the sample banks 
The following table shows 78 sample banks used in our analyses. YES means that the bank has positive exposures to the 
corresponding country based on its annual report. NO means that the bank has no exposures to the corresponding country based 
on the annual report. N/A denotes banks whose annual reports are unavailable from the Edgar Archives or their web-sites. For 
LTCM, the exposures are determined by the presence at the FED meeting instead of the annual report. 
 
Name  Datastream  Mexico  Latin  Korea  Asia  Russia  Brazil  Latin  LTCM 
   Code  1994  1994  1997  1997  1998  1998  1998  Sep. 1998
CITICORP  902245  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
AMSOUTH BANC.   952203  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
ASSD.BANCORP  982295  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
BANK ONE   951043  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
BANK OF NEW YORK  905840  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
BANKBOSTON   902173  N/A  N/A  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO 
BANKERS TST.NY.  902238  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
BANK UTD.  883566  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  N/A  N/A  N/A  NO 
BB & T  992305  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
CCB FINL.  510057  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
CENTURA BANKS   544117  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
CHARTER ONE FINL.   771756  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
CHASE MANHATTAN  902242  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
CITY NATIONAL   952436  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
COLONIAL BANCGROUP   154168  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
COMERICA  922964  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
COMMERCE BCSH.   923340  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
COMPASS BANCSHARES  510078  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
CREDICORP LTD.COM   867078  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  N/A  N/A  N/A  NO 
CRESTAR FINL.   904865  NO  NO  NO  NO  N/A  N/A  N/A  NO 
CULLEN FROST BK  997027  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
DIME BANCORP  729679  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP.  997198  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
1ST.AMER.TENNESSEE  997993  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
M&T BK.   951503  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FIRST SECURITY   923398  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
1ST.TEN.NAT.  905780  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FIRST UNION  951048  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FIRST VA.BANKS  905841  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FIRSTMERIT CORP.   510161  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FLEET FINL.GP   923464  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO 
GOLDEN ST BANCORP   322944  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
GOLDEN WEST FINL.   923564  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
GREENPOINT FINL.CORP.  360583  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
HIBERNIA   981538  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
HNTGTN.BCSH.   951068  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
KEYCORP  916130  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
KEYSTONE FINL.  510276  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
MARSHALL & IISLY  951063  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
MBNA CORP.   544345  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
MELLON BANK   933189  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
MERC.BANCORP   905781  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
MERCANTILE BANK   916448  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
MORGAN JP   902247  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
NAT.CITY  916631  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
NAT.COMMERCE BANCORP.   992066  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
BANK OF AMERICA   923937  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
NORTH FORK BANCORP.  938523  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
NTHN.TRUST   905861  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
WELLS FARGO   906195  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
OLD KENT FINL.   951940  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
PAC.CEN.FINL.   929153  N/A  N/A  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
PEOPLES BK.BRIDGEPORT   517465  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
PNC BANK   944175  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
POPULAR   755658  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
PROVIDENT FINL.GP.  517744  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
REGIONS FINL.CORP.   951144  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
REPUBLIC NY.   929968  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO 
SOUTHTRUST   992303  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
SOVEREIGN BANC.  510428  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
FIRSTAR WI.   951046  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
STATE STR.  951052  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
SUMMIT BANCORP   916878  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
SUNTRUST BANKS   922725  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO   23
SYNOVUS FINL.  510056  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
TCF FINANCIAL   729506  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
TRUSTMARK  982778  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
UNION PLANTERS   951051  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
UNIONBANCAL   922456  N/A  N/A  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
US BANCORP DEL.  905173  N/A  N/A  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
VALLEY NAT.BK.   510474  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
WACHOVIA CORP.   923253  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO 
WASH.FED.COM.  745028  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  NO 
WESTAMERICA BANCORP.   541024  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
WILMINGTON TRUST  998589  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
ZIONS BANCORP.   951584  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL   702406  N/A  N/A  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
ASTORIA FINL.CORP.  357403  N/A  N/A  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
                   
No. of banks whose annual reports are available  50  50  76  76  74  74  74  78 
No. of exposed banks    9  10  10  15  7  10  14  4 
No. of nonexposed banks     41  40  66  61  67  64  60  74   24 
 
Table 12. Sources of the event dates 
The following table shows the sources of the event dates used in our analyses. Our major sources are The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. They are searched from September 
1994 to March 1995 for Mexico, from May 1998 to September 1998 for Russia, from September 1998 to March 1999 for Brazil, and from August 1998 to October 1998 for LTCM. For 
Korea, we use the chronology in Kho and Stulz (2000) and double-check them as in the table. Secondary sources include Financial Times, the Bloomberg Newswire, the IMF News 
Archives (web-site), and other various newspapers. 
 
         The New York Times     The Wall Street Journal     Others       
Mexico                     
Devaluation  941220    12/21/94, Section D; Page 1    12/21/94, Section A; Page 3         
Giving up defense (night)  941221    12/22/94, Section A, Page 1    12/23/94, Section A; Page 3         
Request for IMF help  950106    1/7/95, Section 1; Page 39        Financial Times, 1/7/95, Page 4     
IMF's support announcement  950126     1/27/95, Section A; Page 10    1/27/95, Section A; Page 6         
Korea                     
Giving up defense  971117    11/18/97, Section D; Page 1    11/18/97, Section A; Page 18         
Request for IMF help  971121    11/22/97, Section A; Page 1    11/21/97, Section A; page 16         
IMF's support announcement  971201    12/1/97, Section A; Page 1    12/1/97, Section A; Page 15         
IMF's support announcement  971204     12/4/97, Section A; Page 1    12/4/97, Section A; Page 14         
Russia                     
Request for additional IMF help  980619    6/19/98, Section A; Page 5    6/19/98, Section A; Page 11         
IMF's approval of pre-assigned loan  980625    6/25/98, Section A; Page 2    6/25/98, Section A; Page 19         
IMF's additional support announcement  980713    7/13/98, Section A; Page 1    7/13/98, Section A; Page 9         
Devaluation  980817    8/18/98, Section A; Page 1    8/18/98, Section A; Page 2         
Suspension of ruble trading  980828     8/28/98, Section A; Page 1    8/28/98, Section A; Page 7         
Brazil                     
Dollar's pour-out  980903    9/4/98, Section C; Page 1    9/4/98, Section A; Page 9    Bloomberg Newswire, 9/4/98, morning   
Opening of negotiation with IMF  980915        9/14/98, Section A; Page2    Financial Times, 9/16/98, Front Page   
          9/17/98, Section A; Page 17         
Joint statement of IMF and Brazil  981008        10/9/98, Section A; Page 8    Financial Times, 10/9/98, Int'l, Page 4 / IMF news release, 10/8/98
IMF's support announcement  981113    11/13/98, Section A; Page 1    11/13/98, Section A; Page 2         
      11/14/98, Section A; Page 4             
Devaluation  990113    1/14/99, Section A; Page 1    1/14/98, Section A; Page 1         
Giving up defense  990115     1/16/99, Section A; Page 1        Financial Times, 1/16/99, Currency; Page 11   
LTCM                     
News of LTCM's loss  980902    9/3/98, Section C; Page 1    9/3/98, Section A; Page 2         
Meeting at the FED (23 night)  980924     9/24/98, Section A; Page 1    9/24/98, Section A; Page 1         
                   
         
 